Computationalistic-realism: computation-based ontology
(unpublished concepts from 2005)
When understand something when we can compute it. When we have computation-aided access to it.
New consequences:
Further future, which hasn't happened, does it exist before we reach it?
It doesn't exist as long as it cannot be computed.
I am not talking about prediction here (predictive processing paradigm).
The depth of hierarchy of physics which we don't have any "access", we cannot talk about it.
This reminds of QM refusing existence of hidden variables. But that is about empirical access. But here I speak about conoutation-mediated info-access.
How about prediction? e.g. partial access. Two ways: empirical-info flow and computation time-forward-flow.
BTW, here, time is the external projection of a depth that is mefiated by computation. (not necessarily steps of conoutation).
This can defind a certain type of reduction.
also formalises my (or my favourite) andwer to the so called problem of free will.
If you cannot access it, it doesn't exist. Or it will be meaningless to talk or ask about its existence. It will be a third category of existence (or non existence). It is not even about mathematical existeIt lies outside that.
nce.
Does a future that we can fully compute deterministically, exist? (exists now?)
Not sure. But if no comoutational or predictive, we should not attribute any existence to it.
An example is parallel worlds: Any instance of parallel world, which is hypothetical, does not exist in this sense.
(side note)
Content vs existence of existence:
We know of its existdnce in future (we are sure a future will happen), but we have no access to its contents. We only know a t=10^6 year will exist. but not more than that. Hence, an "unfolded future", does not exist yet.
This means, we asdign a time to the statement about existence. "existence at", which is not about the time of existence, but about the time of the viewer/utterer (objserver).
For that observer, such existence, is not meaningful.
How can we say about the existence of a future moment in time? We can forsyre see it. An "existence" qualifier is valid for the t variable. but it is empty.
(side note to be continued)
An extention is levels of existence: How much effort, resources, extra info, etc will be needed to attain it and access it. It brings about leveks of comoutation.
But practical (life-time) limitations (pragmatic + operational) limitations create pragmatic levels of knowledge and understanding, hence, non-reducible sciences.
This soubds like S.Wolfram's irreducibility, but I said it in 2005 independent and unaware of his progress if he had it.
However, now, I want to pise it not only as a computational-complexity-based account of sphilosiphy of sciences and understanding, info, etc, but also for questions posed about nature of time (eg "existence in future"), and as a basis fir definitions of conplex systems.
Comoutation needs to be brought to centrr of philosoohy.
I have hesitated to formally publish this but this is one main line of argument and lays the vision. It has other aspects too.
